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The external debt position of a country often lies at the heart of her financial crisis. 
While it is well-known that indebtedness and in particular a surge in short-term debts 
often precipitate a debt crisis that is often made worse by runs on a country’s foreign 
exchange, the reasons why a country takes a particular debt position is rarely formally 
explained. This paper investigates the long-term determinants of international 
indebtedness, the time-rates of change of indebtedness, and a nation’s short- to long-
term debt ratio. The data set used is the World Data CD-ROM. Six potential 
explanatory variables are: size, per-cap GNP, growth rate, net-exports, change in 
reserves, and money supply. Cross-sectional regressions are run for each year from 






The debt crisis that gripped a group of South Eastern Asian (SEA) countries 
since the end of 1997 has continued for more than half a year and caused much 
anguish to the countries concerned. Since the problem began, a sense of despair 
spread not only among these countries but throughout the world. A crisis typically 
comes suddenly and catches everyone by surprise.1 This surprise element is even 
more pronounced in the SEA case, since shortly before its onset these were the very 
countries hailed as success stories, 'miracles' of economic growth.2 Despite a large 
literature that emerged in response to the crisis in Mexico and other countries in the 
American continent, the sudden recurrence of another crisis inevitably begs the 
question, ‘how much do we really know about such crises after all’?  
The diagnosis on a financial crisis has a twin focus: its long-term underlying 
and short-term immediate causes. The literature on financial crisis can also be 
categorised along these two lines. Those concentrating on long-term causes typically 
look at balance of payments, government budgets, productivity and economic growth, 
monetary policies and other macroeconomic variables for clues to a country's long-
term vulnerability (some recent examples of this literature include Blanchard (1983), 
Atkeson and Riosrull (1996), Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Cobham (1996), Otker and 
Pazarbasioglu (1996, 1997a, 1997b) Klein and Coutino (1996), and Bernsaid and 
Jeanne (1997)). Others looking for immediate causes emphasise liquidity, self-
fulfilling, herding, panic and other banking behaviour, investor confidence and bank 
'runs' (Cole and Kehoe (1996), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco (1996), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Aschheim, Christou, Swamy 
and Tavlas (1996), Frankel and Schmukler (1996)). Both long- and short-term factors 
are at work prior to a crisis although one may play a more central role than another.  
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A national financial crisis typically exhibits the following pattern: rising level 
of indebtedness, difficulty in servicing debts, increasing short-term debts to pay for 
interests and scheduled capital repayments, capital flights, collapsing currency, the 
debt-exchange crisis finally going into a downward spiral. Our paper takes the hunt 
for an explanation one step backwards. Instead of asking what set off the immediate 
crisis we seek to explain indebtedness itself. More specifically, we wish to find out 
what determines the level, movements, and the structure of a country's indebtedness. 
The World Data CD-ROM provides the data source of our enquiry. 
Admittedly most of the variables available are either crude, incomplete, and far from 
ideally suited for our inquiry. We run a number of cross-sectional regressions, repeat 
it over a ten-year period, and establish a pattern of answers to our questions. Six 
potential explanatory variables are used. They are the size of the economy, per-capita 
GNP, growth rate, net-export, net change of reserves, and money supply. Sections two 
and three below explain and justify the choice of these variables. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section introduces the 
data set. Section three studies the levels of indebtedness, section four the time-rates of 
change of indebtedness, and section five the short- to long-term debt ratios. Section 
six summarises and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this study is extracted from the World Data CD-ROM that 
contains 209 countries, each having a maximum of 730 variables, and spanning the 
years 1960 to 1993. For our purpose the most recent ten years from 1984 to 1993 are 
used. In these years only 92 countries consistently reported data on total external debt. 
In short our extracted data subset contains 92 countries over ten years, with six 
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explanatory variables plus several categories of total debts, long- and short-term 
debts, and population sizes.  
The following table gives a comparative overview of the larger data set at 
1993  (containing 163 countries that reported GNP data) and the subset of 92 
countries used in this study. 
 
Table 1: descriptive statistics of the sample at 1993 (current US$) 





debt per capita 
Entire sample 
(163 countries) 
141 bn 4,843 12.2 bn 757 
Subset sample 
(92 countries) 
141 bn 1,285 15.7 bn 873 
 
The second column of Table 1 shows that the average size of the economies in 
the subset is the same as the wider sample set. The next column shows that we are 
picking up significantly the poorer countries in the sub-sample. The last two columns 
show that nations in the sub-sample are more indebted. In short, the regressions 
reported in this paper focus on the poorer and more indebted nations in the world. 
This selection seems natural since the poorer nations make up the chief borrowers 
who are the subject of our enquiry.  
 
3. Indebtedness 
Two factors underlie the choice of the regression equations in this paper. The 
first is simply the availability, or rather the limitation of the data. The second factor is 
motivated by a small literature on institutional lending behaviour that explains the 
economic, political and social elements of such country risks (see for instance 
Krayenbuehl (1995)). Bankers and other institutional lenders use size of the economy, 
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per capita GNP, debt-service ratio, debt-GNP ratio, interest service ratio, reserves-
imports ratio, current account-GNP ratio, and other similar ratios to gauge transfer 
risks. A big country, for instance, is thought by practitioners to be better able to 
weather currency and exchange fluctuations, and is thus in an advantageous position 
to secure foreign loans. Putting size, GNP per capita and other available variables on 
the right-hand side of the equation is admittedly crude, and the resulting model is not 
supported by a well-founded theoretical base. Our justification for this simple model 
is twofold. First, many lending institutions have used these variables for many years 
without formal justification, thus any systematic evidence will be valuable at this 
point. Second, the results from such a preliminary study throws light on the way a 
more sophisticated model should be built, although such models are beyond the scope 
of the present paper. 
We therefore attempt the following OLS equation: 
exi
i ii
++= ∑ ==610GNPTD ββ       (1) 
where (all currency magnitudes are in 1993 US dollars): 
TD/GNP = total debt outstanding / gross national product; 
x1 = size of the economy in terms of current GNP; 
x2 = per capita GNP; 
x3 = annual GNP growth rate (%); 
x4 = per capita net-export; 
x5 = net change of reserves per capita; 
x6 = per capita money supply (broadly defined); and 
e = error term. 
Now we discuss the choice of the six explanatory variables in turn. The 
coefficient on the first variable simply tells us whether a large country is more 
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indebted. We know a priori that there is a supply-side bias in favour of lending to 
larger countries, arising from the belief held by institutional lenders (see Krayenbuehl 
(1995)), that a larger borrower is a lower-risk borrower. Thus we expect the 
coefficient to be positive, other things being equal. 
The second variable is per capita GNP. Notice that our data includes only 
countries that borrow, and excludes those that lend. Thus we are comparing the richer 
and the poorer borrowers here. Note also that growth performance is picked up by the 
third variable, so x2 reflects only whether the richer borrower country is more 
indebted, irrespective of whether they are also the faster growers.  
Bearing in mind that the data includes only borrowers, the third variable, the 
rate of GNP growth, captures in some ways the utilisation of funds. We can take it for 
granted that the faster growers are heavier investors. Then a positive coefficient on x3 
would mean that the heavier investors also borrow more heavily. It would also mean 
that funds are, more often than not, used for investment purposes.  
The fourth variable, net-export per capita, reflects yet another view held by the 
practitioners that good foreign exchange earning is a good hedge against country 
risks. This tends to increase the supply of funds to these countries, but their demand 
for loans is likely to be lessened by the availability of their own exchange reserves. 
The fifth variable, net change of reserves per capita, will pick up further evidence on 
the relations between debts and internally available funds. 
Finally, the sixth variable on money supply can be justified in the following 
way. Initially one would like to include the fiscal budget position on the right-hand 
side of the equation, since governments often borrow to cover budget deficits. The 
quality of budgetary data from the World Data turns out to be very poor for most low-
income countries. Much better data are reported concerning money supply, 
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presumably because it is more directly measurable. Since money supply is the other 
variable that appears on the budget balance equation, we have opted to include it in 
our regression equation that follows. 
The R2 of the regression is 0.83. Many variables on right-hand side of (1) such 
as GNP however lead one to suspect heteroscedasticity in the regression model. A 
Goldfeld-Quandt test indeed reveals substantial heteroscedasticity with a Goldfeld-
Quandt ratio of 224 against a critical F-ratio of 1.98. A simple way of correcting for 
heteroscedasticity is to divide both sides of Equation (1) with the population size. The 
resulting regression produces a Goldfeld-Quandt ratio of .01, which is substantially 
below the critical value of 1.98. The R2 of the OLS is 0.835. Detail results are 
presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: y = indebtedness (long- plus short-term debts); 1993 















∃i 4.09 2.7E-10 -.0009 -1.6E-6 -.0007 -.008 -5.5E-6 
t-ratios 18.3* 1.43 -9.22* -5.96* -1.21 -4.93* -2.68* 
R2 = 0.835; * = statistically significant at the 1% level; sample size = 92. 
 
 As seen from Table 2, four of the six coefficients are significant at the one-
percent level. To gain further confidence in the reliability of the data however, we 
repeat the regression in each of the ten years from 1984 to 1992. The results are 
reported in Table 2a below, where a sign in brackets denotes a coefficient not 
statistically different from zero at the one-percentage point level. The signs of Table 2 




Table 2a: y = indebtedness (long- plus short-term debts); 10 years compared 



















1993 + (+) - - (-) - - 0.83 
1992 + (+) - - (+) (-) (-) 0.77 
1991 + (+) - - - - - 0.78 
1990 + + - - + + - 0.82 
1989 + (+) - - + + - 0.89 
1988 + (+) - - - + - 0.80 
1987 + (+) - (+) + + (+) 0.76 
1986 + (-) - + (-) + - 0.82 
1985 + (+) - + (-) + - 0.71 
1984 + (+) - + - + - 0.74 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year.  
 
 Now we can summarise Table 2a as follows. 
(a) On the size column, only one year out of ten (1990) produced a significant 
result, and we conclude that the coefficients overall are not significantly 
different from zero. Thus the size of an economy does not have any significant 
impact on indebtedness. This is somewhat surprising. It shows that lending 
institutions do not really favour larger countries as far as total indebtedness is 
concerned. This goes against the conjecture according to some that the sheer 
size of the economy is a guard against country risks (see Krayenbuehl (ibid.)). 
(b) The GNP per capita column is clearly negative. A high-income borrower tends 
to be less indebted, owing possibly to internally available funds. 
(c) Although the growth column is mostly negative, the pattern seems to suggest a 
negative sign for the years after 1988, but a positive one before that year. Thus 
a faster-growing country tended to be more indebted in the early eighties, but 
conversely towards the late eighties and early nineties. This seems as though 
to be saying fast-growing nations depended on foreign debts during the early 
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eighties, but reversed this dependence from then on. They may be paying off 
their debts when their incomes rise. 
(d) Although six out of ten coefficients in the net-exports column are significant, 
the signs do not show a clear enough pattern for a conclusive observation to be 
made.  
(e) Seven out of nine coefficients in the reserves column are positive. Thus in 
seven out of nine years a country with a rising, or faster rising, reserve tends 
to be more indebted. This is perhaps the least intuitive among all the results so 
far. One would expect a nation with rising reserves to have a lesser need for 
foreign debts. This was indeed the case in 1991 to 1993. One possible 
explanation for the positive signs in the eighties is a supply-side effect, with 
lenders possibly pushing loans to countries with rising reserves at 
exceptionally attractive terms. 
(f) The money supply column is clearly negative. Thus nations with a higher 
money supply per capita tends to be less indebted. They probably just 
substitute the need to borrow with domestic money supply. 
 
Apart from total indebtedness, it will be interesting to study long-term and 
short-term debts separately. This is done in Tables 2b and 2c below. 
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Table 2b: y = indebtedness (long-term debts only); 10 years compared 
 



















1993 + (+) - - (-) - - 0.83 
1992 + (+) - - (+) (-) (-) 0.77 
1991 + (+) - - - - - 0.78 
1990 + + - - + + - 0.80 
1989 + (+) - - + + - 0.90 
1988 + (+) - - - + - 0.83 
1987 + (+) - (+) + + (-) 0.77 
1986 + (-) - + (-) + - 0.83 
1985 + + - + (-) (+) - 0.73 
1984 + (+) - + - + - 0.81 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year. 
 
 
Table 2c: y = indebtedness (short-term debts only); 10 years compared 
 



















1993 + (+) - (+) - - + 0.84 
1992 + (+) - - (+) (-) (-) 0.73 
1991 + (+) (+) - - - - 0.82 
1990 + + - - + + - 0.88 
1989 + (+) - - (+) + - 0.83 
1988 (+) (-) (+) (-) (-) + (-) 0.41 
1987 + (-) (-) (-) + + (+) 0.46 
1986 (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) + (+) 0.51 
1985 (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) 0.32 
1984 (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+) 0.33 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year. 
 
 Tables 2a and 2b are practically identical, save a difference in significance in 
1985's reserves variable, and a difference in signs in 1987's money supply variable, 
though that is not statistically significance in both Tables. We conclude therefore that 
the behaviour of long-term and total debts outstanding are very similar in all 
respects, as they are summarised in points (a) to (f) in the preceding paragraphs. 
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 We will therefore concentrate on the differences between long- and short-term 
debts. The first difference arises from the GNP per capita columns (the size variable 
again fails to exert any significant effect on short-term debt). While all the significant 
coefficients in this column in Table 2b remain negative, for the majority of years (six 
out of ten) per capita GNP did not have any significant influence on short-term debts, 
yet the impact on long-term debts was consistently negative. In other words, more 
often than not a rich nation has just as much tendencies to incur short-term debts as a 
poorer nation does. 
 A second, more important difference concerns with the money supply columns 
of the two tables. The consistently negative signs observed in Table 2b are replaced in 
Table 2c by a positive one for 1993, and by four other positive (albeit insignificant) 
ones from 1984 to 1987. At least in 1993 those with lax monetary policy also got 
more heavily indebted short-term, and there arises a suspicion that the same may have 
occurred between 1984 to 1987. There seems to be a hint that money supply is 
perhaps the factor that deserves more scrutiny in hunting for the causes of debt crisis. 
 
4. Time-rates of changes in indebtedness 
Apart from seeking the determinants of the levels of indebtedness, it will also 
be interesting to see how such levels change over time. A simple way to approach this 
is to replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) by its time-rates of change, viz. 
exdtddtd i
i ii
++=− ∑ ==610GNPGNPTDTD ββ .    (2) 
The time derivatives on the left-hand side are taken to be discrete changes from year t 
to t+1; the other variables in Equation (2) take their values at year t. The independent 
variables are the same as in the previous section. Again both sides of the equation are 
divided by the population size at each year to correct for heteroscedasticity. Ten 
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regressions are run for each of the debt category, and the results, concentrating on the 
signs and the statistical significance, are presented in Tables 3a to 3c below.  
 
Table 3a: y = time-rate of change in indebtedness (long- plus short-term debts); 
10 years compared 



















1992-3 (+) (+) - + - + + 0.89 
91-92 (-) (+) - - - (-) + 0.85 
90-91 + + - - (+) + - 0.74 
89-90 + (-) + - - + + 0.89 
88-89 + + - (+) - + - 0.80 
87-88 (+) (-) + + - + (+) 0.77 
86-87 + (-) (+) - - - + 0.93 
85-86 + (+) - + - (+) (-) 0.96 
84-85 + (+) - + (-) (+) (-) 0.79 
83-84 + (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (+) 0.57 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year. 
 
 
Table 3b: y = time-rate of change in indebtedness (long -term debts only); 
10 years compared 



















1992-3 + + - - - + - 0.87 
91-92 (+) (+) - - - (-) + 0.86 
90-91 + (+) - - (-) + + 0.79 
89-90 + - + - - + + 0.92 
88-89 + (+) - + - + + 0.84 
87-88 + (+) - + - + (+) 0.73 
86-87 + (-) (+) - + - + 0.92 
85-86 + (+) - + - + + 0.97 
84-85 + (+) - + (-) + + 0.84 
83-84 + (+) - (+) + (-) + 0.74 










Table 3c: y = time-rate of change in indebtedness (short-term debts only); 
10 years compared 
 



















1992-3 (-) (-) - + - + + 0.67 
91-92 (+) (+) (-) - - (+) (-) 0.70 
90-91 (+) (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (-) 0.02 
89-90 (+) (+) (-) + (+) (+) (-) 0.11 
88-89 (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) 0.02 
87-88 - (-) + + (+) + + 0.37 
86-87 + (-) - + - + - 0.59 
85-86 (-) + - (-) - - - 0.63 
84-85 (+) + (-) (+) (-) (-) (-) 0.06 
83-84 - - + + (-) (+) - 0.75 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year. 
 
 These results can be summarised as follows. 
(a) Size continues to exert little influence on the dependent variable. 
(b) Though wealth, or GNP per capita, has a consistently negative sign throughout 
Tables 2a to 2c, a few positive signs emerge in Tables 3a to 3c. In these years 
the richer nations were more likely to increase their indebtedness than the 
poorer ones. 
(c) There are again more positive signs in the growth column in Tables 3a to 3c 
than in Tables 2a to 2c. In Table 3a, for example, four out of eight significant 
coefficients are positive whereas only three in nine are positive in Table 2a. In 
short, faster-growing countries often raise their degree of indebtedness faster 
than the slower-growing ones, although the latter still have higher levels of 
indebtedness. 
(d) Net-export clearly has a more significant and negative impact in Tables 3a to 
3c than in Tables 2a to 2c. In Table 3a, for instance, all seven significant 
coefficients in the net-export column are negative. In words, a country that is 
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strong in exporting is less likely to increase its indebtedness than one that is 
weak in exporting. 
(e) The positive signs in the reserves columns in Tables 3a to 3c seem again 
counter-intuitive as they were in Tables 2a to 2c. Rather fewer of them are 
statistically significant in Table 3a, for example, as compared to those in Table 
2a. A puzzle remains as to why a nation with rising reserves should increase 
its level of indebtedness. A possible answer, offered earlier though might not 
be entirely satisfactory, is lender's preference for nations with rising reserves; 
i.e. there may be supply-push factors at work in the reserves column. 
(f) The most striking difference between Tables 2a-c and Tables 3a-c lies in the 
money supply columns. The predominantly negative signs in the former are 
replaced by positive ones in the latter (see for instance Tables 2b and 2c). A 
nation with large per capita money supply tends therefore to have low levels 
of foreign debts, but faster rising indebtedness. Such a situation presumably 
will not last forever. While the underlying reasons are not immediately 
apparent, this result at least draws our attention to money supply as the more 
likely candidate for explaining debt crisis that occurred in the recent past. 
 
5. Short- to long-term debt ratios 
Many debt crises were preceded by sharp rises in the ratio between short- and 
long-term debts. It will be interesting to investigate the determinants of this debt ratio. 
We do this in this section by putting the debt ratio on the left-hand side of the 
regression, the six independent variables are the same as those in Equations (1) and 





++= ∑ ==610LTDSTD ββ      (3) 
Table 4: y = short-term debt/long-term debt; 10 years compared 
 



















1993 (+) (+) (-) + (+) - + 0.82 
1992 (-) (+) + - + - + 0.55 
1991 - - + (-) - - + 0.88 
1990 (-) (-) + - - (+) (-) 0.76 
1989 - (-) + - - - (-) 0.73 
1988 - - + (+) - + + 0.83 
1987 - (-) - - - - + 0.77 
1986 - (-) + - (-) (-) + 0.85 
1985 (+) - + (-) (+) + + 0.80 
1984 (+) - + (-) + (-) + 0.79 
(ÿ) = Statistically not significantly different from zero at the 5% level; sample size = 92 in each year. 
 
 We will now summarise the contents of Table 4. We take this opportunity to 
compare with the findings of the two previous sets of results. The following points 
therefore serve also as a summary of the findings of this paper as a whole.  
(a) The column of GNP in Table 4 returns a predominantly negative sign. Recall 
this is the first significant impact the size variable has on any dependent 
variable in this study. In short, size has no influence on a country’s overall 
indebtedness, or on her rate of increase of indebtedness, but larger countries 
have lower short- to long-term debt ratios.  
(b) The GNP per capita column is clearly positive. The positive signs are opposite 
to those found in the wealth columns of both sets of Tables 2a-c and 3a-c. 
Richer nations therefore tend to be less indebted, have slower time-rates of 
change of indebtedness, but have higher short- to long-term debt ratios. 
(c) The column of growth rates is basically (five of the six significant coefficients 
are) negative. This is similar to the debt-level Tables 2a to 2c, but opposed to 
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many cases in the rates of change Tables 3a to 3c. Thus a faster-growing 
country tends to have lower overall indebtedness, higher rate of increase in 
indebtedness, and lower short- to long-term debt ratios. 
(d) The net-exports column is predominantly (five out of seven significant 
coefficients are) negative. Recall that the signs in Tables 2a-c were 
inconclusive, and those in Tables 3a-c were negative. Thus a strong exporting 
country tends to have lower rates of change of indebtedness, lower short- to 
long-term debt ratios, but the impact on the level of indebtedness is 
inconclusive. 
(e) The reserves column is largely (five out of seven significant coefficients are) 
negative. Recall that the signs in both Tables 2a-c and 3a-c were positive. We 
conclude that a country with rising reserves tends to have higher levels of 
indebtedness, faster rates of change of indebtedness, but lower short- to long-
term debt ratios. 
(f) Finally, the money supply column is clearly positive. Recall that the signs in 
Tables 2a-c were negative and those in Tables 3a-c were positive. Thus a 
country with larger money supply per capita tends to lower levels of 
indebtedness, faster rates of change of indebtedness, and higher short- to 
long-term debt ratios. 
 






6. Summary and conclusions 
To fix ideas the overall findings of this paper (see also points a to f in section 
five) can be summarised in Table 5. 






























































µ = No significant impact; +/- = mixed results. 
 
We now consider each column of Table 5 in turn. The first one on size is 
interesting particularly since lending agencies supposedly regard size to offer 
protection against country risks. Our data offers no evidence to suggest that they do. 
On the other hand, larger economies are able to secure more long-term loans. To the 
extent that short-term loans are more volatile and subject to 'runs', we may tentatively 
conclude that larger countries are less vulnerable to crisis situations. 
 Next we consider the GNP per capita column in Table 5. The first two entries 
are as expected, from demand considerations, since richer countries typically are 
lenders rather than borrowers. The last row's negative sign seems intriguing, but it 
would be incorrect to conclude that richer countries are therefore more vulnerable to 
short-term debt crisis. The negative sign probably reflects not their particular need for 
short-term debts, but rather their relative independence from long-term debts. 
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 The growth column is next. The two negative signs suggest that faster-
growing countries are less indebted, especially in short-term debts. This is 
encouraging, in so far as it gives evidence that growth does not render a country more 
vulnerable to indebtedness and crisis attacks. The Asian debt crisis should perhaps not 
be seen as a consequence of their successful growth. The positive sign in the middle 
row suggests that the faster a country grow the faster will her indebtedness rise. This 
is not altogether surprising, until one realises that such countries will still have lower 
level of indebtedness in the end. 
The next column, net-exports, behave quite similarly to the growth column 
and perhaps for very similar reasons too. 
The next column is reserves. Two factors might have contributed to the two 
positive signs. On the one hand, lenders clearly prefer borrowers with larger and 
rising reserves. On the other hand, those heavily indebted must also accumulate 
reserves in order to service the debts. Neither of these is really surprising. The 
remaining negative sign is more interesting when viewed in the following way, that 
those countries with slower rise (or faster fall) in reserves also incur more short-term 
than long-term debts. One should be quite alarmed indeed when a country's short- to 
long-term debt rises since the reserves might probably be decreasing too. 
Finally we come to the money supply column. The picture here seems mixed. 
Lax money supply is associated with low levels of indebtedness on the one hand, but 
high relative reliance on short-term debt on the other hand. The impact a lax monetary 
policy has on the short-term debt ratio seems more worrying, as far as debt problems 
are concerned, than the other variables examined in this paper. 
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1 It is almost by definition that the great majority of banks and individuals always fail 
to see a crisis coming. This chronic failure of judgement and foresight of course 
presents ample opportunity for huge sums of money to be made overnight by a 
shrewd, fortunate and speculating few.    
2 Both the World Bank and the IMF remain very positive about the East Asian 
economic prospects right up to the eve of the crisis. The World Bank, for instance, 
wrote in its 1997 Annual Report (p.48), “And although there are some concerns about 
the fragility of the region’s banking systems, the risks of loss of confidence in the 
banking systems would be easy to overstate, since most East Asian countries have a 
more robust external and fiscal position than countries that have faced banking crisis 
elsewhere. The prospects for continued high growth in coming years remain sound, 
provided countries undertake the necessary important reforms.” Just two years before 
the crisis an Indonesian economist reported that “Indonesia is not headed toward a 
crisis in the immediate future” (Radelet (1995), p.39).  
